Partial functions are abundant in mathematics and program specifications. Unfortunately, their importance has been mostly ignored in automated theorem proving. In this paper, we develop a theorem proving strategy for Partial Classical Logic (PCL). Proof search takes place in Kleene Logic. We show that PCL theories can be translated into equivalent sets of formulas in Kleene logic. For proof search we use a three-valued adaptation of geometric resolution. We prove that the calculus is sound and complete.
Introduction and Motivation
Partial Classical Logic (PCL) was introduced in [8] with the goal of being able to deal with rich type systems and partial functions. Since the preconditions of partial functions can be complicated, as complicated as the proof itself, the preconditions have to be expressed in the same language as the reasoning problem.
A second design aim of PCL is that there should be no distinction between preconditions and types. For example, if P is a pointer type and p has type P, then retrieving ⋆p is possible when p is not the null pointer. One can either treat the type of N non-null pointers as a subtype of P, and treat ⋆ as a total, unary function on N, or treat ⋆ as a partial function on P that is defined when p = 0. The resulting semantics should be the same. This is in contrast with existing formalisms for partial functions that start with an underlying, simple type theory, and add partial functions by allowing functions to have preconditions expressed by logical formulas. This approach is followed in [12] , [13] . In PCL, both the underlying type theory and the preconditions, are expressed in the same way by logical formulas. an example of a simply typed theory, expressed in PCL. Formulas in the same row have the same meaning. We assume that ≡ is properly axiomatized. Type conditions connected to universal quantifiers are relativized by implications. In order to obtain type strictness, a lazy implication operator [A]B is used. There also exists a lazy conjunction operator A B that is used in combination with existential quantifiers.
When the formulas involved are well-typed, [A]B has the same semantics as A → B in untyped, classical logic. In order for [A]B to be well-typed, the first argument A must be well-typed. When A is true, the second argument B has to be well-typed. The last formula in the example can be replaced ∀xy N (x) ∧ N (y) → x + S(y) ≈ S(x + y) without changing the meaning, but only because it is well-typed. If the formula would not have been well-typed, we would have replaced a meaningless formula by a formula that probably means something unwanted. This is the general reason why typing exists: Type systems and the possibility to enforce preconditions of partial functions are features that make it easier to write down correct formulas because they allow separate checking. Typing does not increase the strength of what can be meaningfully expressed in the logic, because typing conditions can always be relativized. The situation is similar to type systems in programming languages: Type systems do not make more programs possible, but they make it easier to write correct programs because they provide automatic checking. A programmer who never makes mistakes does not need type checking. In Example 2, a predicate ≤ and a partial function (−) were added. The (1) ∀d #D(x) (2) ∀l #L(l) (3)
predicate ≤ is defined everywhere on N. The function (−) is defined only when the first argument is not smaller than the second. In the row where − is declared, the left and the right column in Figure 2 are not equivalent anymore. In the right column, the precondition of (−) can be expressed. It follows from the axiomatization of ≤, that for every occurrene of t 1 − t 2 , it is possible to prove t 2 ≤ t 1 . If one would want to express the precondition of (−)in the left column, one would have to extend the language with a formalism for expressing the precondition. This causes the type system to be different from the language in which preconditions are expressed. This was done e.g in [12] , [13] , [14] , or [7] . Alternatively, one can relativize the precondition using →, but if one does so, one looses the possibility to have it typechecked. In the right column, type conditions are preconditions can be stated together, and they will be enforced. Figure 3 contains a formalization of a list datatype. The first two formulas introduce a datatype D and a type of lists L. Formulas (5) and (6) state that L can be partitioned into L n (nil), and L c (lists constructed by cons.) Formula (10) defines the functions first and rest as partial functions that are defined on L c . The pattern of Example 3 can be applied to all inductively defined types. Every inductive types has subtypes that correspond to the constructors and partial selector functions that are defined only for terms that are constructed by a given constructor. Using Example 3, one can check type correctness of the
which is the translation of the program define append(l, m) if l ≡ nil then return m else return cons( first(l), append(rest(l), m) ).
Using the specification in Example 3, it is possible to prove #A, where A is the formula above. In order to prove type correctness of the second part of A, one has to prove that m ≡ nil implies L c (m), in order to be able to apply first and rest on L. The formula A can be translated into classical logic, by replacing [ ] by → . This formula means the same, only because it is well-typed, but it would mean something unwanted if A would contain type incorrectness or ignored preconditions. Dependent on the mistake made, this may result in a specification that is stronger than intended, and which may be hard to detect.
Introduction to PCL
In this section, we will introduce the semantics of PCL, and provide a sequent calculus. We do this not only to make the paper self-contained, but also because there have been changes in the semantics and the sequent calculus for PCL since [8] . The changes were motivated by experience with the use of PCL in interactive systems, and by insights that were obtained when writing the current paper. The transformation to Kleene logic that is used in this paper for automated theorem proving, and which is based on widening (Definition 2.15), can also be used for defining a sequent calculus. The resulting sequent calculus has simpler rules than the calculus that was used in [8] . Since it is closely related to the theorem proving method, it is suitable to introduce it together. In addition to the changes in the sequent calculus, there has been changes in the semantics as well: In earlier versions of PCL, we believed that all type information should be expressed by user defined predicates, and as a consequence, the Boolean truth values could be mixed with the domains of discourse introduced by the user. It was left to the user to define predicates that separate the different types. There was no syntactic distinction between atoms and terms, and Prop() was viewed as a predefined function symbol, that could be applied on every expression. This approach led to a couple of artefacts, that are hard to handle by deduction rules, and which at the same time are not meaningful. For example, it was possible to write the formula ∃x 1 x 2 Prop(x 1 ) ∧ Prop(x 2 ) → x 1 ≈ x 2 , which is valid, because there are two distinct Booleans in every interpretation.
Our current view is that such formulas should not be allowed. If the user wants to use a Boolean data type, this datatype should be defined by the user, and it should be separate from the truth values used by the logic. Hence, we will distinguish atoms and terms, and Prop will become a unary logical operator, similar to negation. A consequence of this modification is that we can reduce the number of error values to one. In [8] , it was necessary to allow multiple error values, in order to avoid that ¬Prop(a) ∧ ¬Prop(b) → a ≈ b is a tautology. But since this formula cannot be stated anymore, there is no need to worry about its truth. To reflect the fact that Prop() is not a function but a logical operator, we will write #A instead of Prop(A).
The calculus that we will define in this paper is called Seq P CL . The calculus that was used in [8] was called Seq 2 P CL . The main difference is as follows: Since PCL has quite a few logical operators, both calculi use reduction rules to replace most of the operators by a small set of operators. In this way, reasoning rules need to be defined only for some primitive operators. A similar approach is often used in classical logic. If one defines a rewrite rule that replaces A → B by ¬A∨B, then one does not need reasoning rules for → anymore. The rewrite rules of Seq 2 P CL were truth-value preserving. During the development of theorem proving strategies, it turned out that one can obtain a better calculus if one uses widening (defined in Definition 2.15) instead of truth equivalence. The resulting calculus has fewer reasoning rules, and the reasoning rules are simpler. Since we use notation for the widening relation, the new calculus is Seq P CL .
We will first define the formulas of PCL. After that, we define the semantics, and the notion of context. Definition 2.1. We first define terms: If f is a function symbol with arity n ≥ 0, and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is a term as well. Using terms, we define the set of formulas as follows:
• ⊥, E and ⊤ are formulas.
• If t 1 and t 2 are terms, then t 1 ≈ t 2 is a formula.
• If p is a predicate symbol with arity n ≥ 0, and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is a formula.
• If F is a formula, then ¬F and #F are formulas.
• If F and G are formulas, then F ∨ G, F ∧ G, F → G, and F ↔ G are formulas.
• If F and G are formulas, then F G and [F ]G are formulas.
• If F is a formula, and x is a variable, then ∀x F and ∃x F are formulas.
We use ≈ for equality in formulas, in order to distinguish it from meta equality, so that we can write 'I(t 1 ≈ t 2 ) = t ′ . We define three-valued interpretations:
, where f , e, t are distinct objects. The function [ ] interprets function symbols as functions from D n to D and predicate symbols as functions from D n to {f , e, t}, in accordance with the arity of the symbol.
we define the interpretation function I(), that interprets all terms and formulas.
• If f is a function symbol of arity n, and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then
• If p is a predicate symbol of arity n, and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then I( p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ) = [p](I(t 1 ), . . . , I(t n )).
• I(⊥) = f , I(E) = e, and I(⊤) = t.
Figure 4: Semantics of Logical Operators
• The semantics of ¬ and # is defined by the following truth tables:
t f t
• The semantics of the strict operators ∨, ∧, → and ↔ is defined by the following truth tables:
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• The semantics of the quantifiers is defined by the following preferences:
• For a unary propositional operator ⋆, the interpretation of I(⋆A) is defined as the value in the corresponding table in Figure 4 , using the value of I(A) in the order f , e, t.
• For a binary propositional operator ⋆, the interpretation of I(A ⋆ B) is defined as the value in the corresponding table in Figure 4 . The row is determined by the value of I(A) in the order f , e, t, and the column is determined by the value of I(B), also in the order f , e, t.
• For a quantifier Q, the value of I(Qx F ) is obtained as follows: First define
is obtained by selecting from R F the most preferred value using the preference list for Q in Figure 4 .
In PCL, theories are constructed in contexts. A context is a mixture of assumptions and theorems. The order of formulas in a context is essential, because theorems must be provable from the formulas that occur before them, and types of functions and predicates have to be specified before they are used. Contexts play the role of the first component of Seq 2 P CL -sequents in [8] .
Definition 2.4. We call an object of form Γ 1 , . . . , Γ m , in which Γ j (m ≥ 0) are formulas, and in which some of the Γ j are possibly marked with a ϑ, a context.
Formulas that are marked with ϑ denote theorems, which means that they are provable from the formulas that occur before them. Unmarked formulas are assumptions.
ϑ is marked as theorem, which is correct, because it is provable from the formulas A and B. The formulas A and B can be assumed because #A and #B occur before them. Definition 2.6. Let Γ be a context. We say that Γ is strongly valid if in every interpretation I, for which there is an i, s.t. I(Γ i ) = t, the first such i satisfies the following condition:
• Γ i is not marked as theorem and I(Γ i ) = f .
Strong validity captures the intuition that theorems must be provable from the formulas before them, and assumptions must be well-defined assuming the formulas before them. The following theorem, which is a generalization of Theorem 1 in [8] , confirms this.
Theorem 2.7. The context Γ 1 , . . . , Γ m is strongly valid iff for every interpretation I, for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ m), the following holds:
• If Γ i is not marked, then I(Γ 1 ) = · · · = I(Γ i−1 ) = t implies I(Γ i ) ∈ {f , t}.
• If Γ i is marked, then I(Γ 1 ) = · · · = I(Γ i−1 ) = t implies I(Γ i ) = t.
Proof. First assume that Γ 1 , . . . , Γ m is strongly valid. Assume that I is an interpretation and that I(Γ 1 ) = · · · = I(Γ i−1 ) = t. If Γ i is not marked, then by definition of strong validity, I(Γ i ) = t ⇒ I(Γ i ) = f , so that I(Γ i ) ∈ {f , t}. If Γ i is marked, then it follows from the definition of strong validity, that it cannot be the case that I(Γ i ) = t. Hence we have shown that I(Γ i ) = t. Now suppose that the converse holds. We must show that Γ 1 , . . . , Γ m is strongly valid. Assume that there exists an i, s.t. I(Γ i ) = t. We can assume that i is minimal. If Γ i is marked, then we have obtained a contradiction with
is not strongly valid, because Definition 2.6 is not met by I with I(A) = e, I(B) = t. The context #A, A, B, (A ∧ B) ϑ is still not strongly valid, because it is possible that I(B) = e, which would make B with I(B) = f the first formula with I(B) = t.
In order to make the context strongly valid, we also have to add #B, so that we get #A, #B, A, B, (A ∧ B) ϑ .
In order to make the context strongly valid, one has to make sure that predicates G and M (Greek and Mortal) are always well-defined:
The predicates G and M are currently too general. In order to be more realistic, they can be restricted to be subpredicates of a predicate H (Human):
If the formula H(s) G(s) would be replaced by H(s) ∧ G(s), the resulting context would be not strongly valid anymore, because one can have I(H(s)) = f , I(G(s)) = e, while making all the formulas before it true.
would make the context not strongly valid anymore, because there could exist a term t with I(H(t)) = f , I(G(t)) = e.
Our goal in the current section is to describe the sequent calculus Seq P CL , which is an improvement of Seq 2 P CL . Calculus Seq 2 P CL is based on Theorem 2.7, which makes it possible to replace a context by a set of standard implications, which can be proven by traditional means. The calculus Seq P CL is based on a stronger equivalence, which we will prove shortly. Definition 2.10. A sequent is an object of form S ⊢ ⊥, in which S is a set of formulas.
Definition 2.11. We call a set of formulas S unsatisfiable if for every interpretation I, there is a formula A ∈ S, s.t. I(A) = t. We say that a set of sequents {S 1 ⊢ ⊥, . . . , S n ⊢ ⊥} represents a property P if P ⇔ all S i are unsatisfiable.
and { } otherwise.
It is clear that Definition 2.12 is inspired by Theorem 2.7. For unmarked Γ i , the set E( Γ , i) represents the property I( 
of Seq 2 P CL preserve unsatisfiability, which means that for every rule, S is unsatisfiable iff all S i are unsatisfiable. The further design of Seq 2 P CL is standard. It was presented as a sequent calculus, but it can be presented as a tableau calculus as well.
We will now introduce a new calculus called Seq P CL , which is based on the observation that Seq( Γ ) represents validity of Γ in a strong fashion. We will first define strong representation, then prove that it holds, and after that, introduce the calculus. We will also explain why Seq P CL is better than Seq 2 P CL . Definition 2.13. We say that a set of formulas S is strongly unsatisfiable if for every interpretation I, there is a formula A ∈ S, s.t. I(A) = f .
We say that a set of sequents S 1 ⊢ ⊥, . . . , S n ⊢ ⊥ strongly represents a property P iff 1. P is true implies that all of the S i are strongly unsatisfiable.
2. P is false implies that (at least) one of the S i is satisfiable. Theorem 2.14. For every context Γ, the sequent expansion Seq( Γ ) strongly represents the property that Γ is strongly valid.
Proof. We first prove (1) of Definition 2.13. Assume that Γ is strongly valid. Write Γ = Γ 1 , . . . , Γ m . Let I be an arbitrary interpretation. If there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, s.t. I(Γ i ) = t, then let i be the smallest such number. Otherwise, leave i undefined.
Let S ⊢ ⊥ be a sequent that occurs in Seq( Γ ). Let λ be the level on which S ⊢ ⊥ was introduced. We have to show that there exists an A ∈ S, s.t.
• If i is undefined or λ < i, then we have I(Γ λ ) = I(#Γ λ ) = t, so that
• If i is defined and λ = i, then it follows from the definition of strong validity, that Γ i is not marked. This implies that E ϑ ( Γ , i) = ∅, so that (S ⊢ ⊥) ∈ E( Γ , i). By strong validity of Γ , we know that I(Γ i ) = f , so that I(¬#Γ i ) = f as well. Since ¬#Γ i ∈ S, we can take A = ¬#Γ i .
• If i is defined and λ > i, then it follows from strong validity of Γ ,
In both cases, we have Γ i ∈ S, so that we can take A = Γ i .
Next we prove (2) of Definition 2.13. Assume that Γ is not strongly valid. This means that there exist an interpretation I and an i, s.t. I(Γ i ) = t, where the first such i has either I(Γ i ) = f , or Γ i is marked. This can be reformulated as either I(Γ i ) = e, or I(Γ I ) = f and Γ i is marked. In both cases, λ < i ⇒ I(Γ λ ) = t.
• If I(Γ i ) = e, then I(¬#Γ i ) = t. It follows that all formulas in the premise of {Γ 1 , . . . , Γ i−1 , ¬#Γ i } ⊢ ⊥ are true in I. Since this sequent is included in E( Γ , i), the proof is complete for this case.
• If Γ i is marked and I(Γ i ) = f , then I(¬Γ i ) = t. It follows that all formulas in the premise of {Γ 1 , . . . , Γ i−1 , ¬Γ i } ⊢ ⊥ are true in I. Since this sequent is included in E ϑ ( Γ , i), the proof is complete.
The advantage of strong representation is that it makes it possible to ignore error values during proof search. Either, it is possible to make all formulas in all sequents true, or there always is a false formula in some sequent. A calculus that is based on standard unsatisfiability has to preserve error values during proof search, since otherwise it might replace an unsatisfiable sequent by a satisfiable sequent. A calculus based on strong representation can ignore error values. We prove that error values can be ignored: Definition 2.15. We define the widening relation as follows: A B if in every interpretation I, we have
We write A ≡ B if A B and B A. It can be easily checked that A ≡ B iff I(A) = I(B) in every interpretation I. In this case, we call the formulas equivalent.
Theorem 2.16. Let {S 1 ⊢ ⊥, . . . , S n ⊢ ⊥} be a set of sequents that strongly represents a property P. Let A and B be two formulas with A B.
Let {S
. . , S n ⊢ ⊥} by possibly replacing some occurrences of A by B.
Then {S ′ 1 ⊢ ⊥, . . . , S ′ n ⊢ ⊥} strongly represents property P as well. Proof. First assume that P is true. In that case all S i are strongly unsatisfiable. Let I be an interpretation. Let S i be one of the S 1 , . . . , S n . By Definition 2.13, S i contains a formula C with I(C) = f . If still C ∈ S ′ i , then we are done. Otherwise, it must be the case that C = A and B ∈ S ′ i . Since A B, it follows that I(B) = f .
Next assume that P is false. This implies that one of the S i is satisfiable, which means that there is an interpretation I, in which all formulas of S i are true. We show that all formulas in S ′ i are true in I as well. Let C be a formula in S ′ i . If C ∈ S i , then we are done. Otherwise, we have C = B and A ∈ S i . Since I(A) = t and A B, we have I(B) = t, so that the proof is complete. • The semantics of the binary operators ⊗ and ⊕ is defined by the following truth tables:
f f f f e e f e t ⊕ :
f e t e e t t t t
• The semantics of the quantifiers Π and Σ is defined by the following preferences:
The calculus Seq P CL is based on the fact that the natural sequent rules for Kleene logic preserve strong representation, in combination with the fact that all PCL operators can be widened into their corresponding Kleene operators by simple replacement rules. The result is a calculus that does not have many reasoning rules, and that is easy to use. We will use the notation ⊗ for Kleene conjunction, ⊕ for Kleene disjunction, Π for Kleene universal quantification, and Σ for Kleene existential quantification. Definition 2.17. We extend the set of formulas, defined in Definition 2.1, with two binary operators and two quantifiers as follows:
• If F and G are formulas, then F ⊗ G and F ⊕ G are formulas as well.
• If F is a formula and x is a variable, then Πx F and Σx F are formulas.
We extend the interpretation of formulas, defined in Definition 2.3, by the tables in Figure 5 . Theorem 2.18. For every rule of Figure 6 , that is written as A B, it is indeed the case that A B. For every rule that is written as A ≡ B, it is indeed the case that A ≡ B.
We can now define the deduction rules of Seq P CL . The rules are listed in Figure 7 . We will prove that backward application of a deduction rule on a sequent preserves strong representation. In order to do this, we first prove the following property: 1. If S ∪ R is satisfiable, then there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ p), s.t. S ∪ R i is satisfiable.
2. If S ∪ R is strongly unsatisfiable, then for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ p), S ∪ R i is strongly unsatisfiable. 
Rules for #: Figure 6 )
In the Σ rule, y must be not free in S or P [x]. In the Π rule, t denotes an arbitrary term.
Proof. We first fix some notation that will be used throughout the proof. For a set of formulas S, we write I(S) = t if for every A ∈ S, I(A) = t. We write I(S) = f if there is an A ∈ S, s.t. I(A) = f . We will not give proofs for all rules, because some of them are very similar.
Axiom: Consider the first axiom, so that we have p = 0 and R = {⊥}. The set of formulas S ∪ {⊥} is not satisfiable, so that we may assume that there is an 1 ≤ i ≤ p, s.t. S ∪ R i is satisfiable, when it happens.
Since there are no i with (1 ≤ i ≤ p), we may assume that each S ∪ R i is strongly unsatisfiable.
The other two axioms are similar.
Equivalence: It can be easily checked that A B implies ¬A ¬B. This means that in both cases, we can assume that the rule has form S∪{A} S∪{B} . If S ∪ {A} is satisfiable, then there is an interpretation I, s.t. I(S) = I(A) = t. Since A B, we also have I(B) = t, so that S ∪ {B} is satisfiable as well. Now assume that S ∪ {A} is strongly unsatisfiable. Assume that I is an interpretation. If I(S) = f , then we are done. Otherwise, it must be the case that I(A) = f , by strong unsatisfiability of S ∪ {A}. Since we have A B, we also have I(B) = f . ⊕: Assume that S ∪ {A ⊕ B} is satisfiable. This means that there is an interpretation I, s.t. I(S) = I(A ⊕ B) = t. From the truth table of ⊕ in Figure 5 , it follows that either I(A) = t or I(B) = t. As a consequence, we have either I(S ∪ {A}) = t or I(S ∪ {B}) = t.
Next assume that S ∪ {A ⊕ B} is strongly unsatisfiable. For every interpretation I, we have I(S ∪ {A ⊕ B}) = f . We show that I(S ∪ {A}) is strongly unsatisfiable. Strong unsatisfiability of I(S ∪ {B}) follows by symmetry. Let I be an arbitrary interpretation. If I(S) = f , then we are done. Otherwise, it must be the case that I(A ⊕ B) = f , which implies that I(A) = f , so that the proof is complete.
⊗: Assume that S ∪ {A ⊗ B} is satisfiable. There is an interpretation I, s.t. I(S) = I(A ⊗ B) = t. It follows from the truth table of ⊗ that I(A) = I(B) = t, which implies that S ∪ {A, B} is satisfiable.
Next assume that S ∪ {A ⊗ B} is strongly unsatisfiable. We have to show that S ∪ {A, B} is strongly unsatisfiable as well. Let I be an arbitrary interpretation. If I(S) = f , then we are done at this point. Otherwise, it must be the case that I(A ⊗ B) = f , which implies that either I(A) = f or I(B) = f . In both cases, we have I(S ∪ {A, B}) = f , so that the proof is complete.
Since y is not free in P [x], we also have
Next we assume that S ∪ {Σx.P [x]} is strongly unsatisfiable and prove that S ∪ {P [y]} is strongly unsatisfiable as well. Let I be an arbitrary interpretation of S ∪ {P [y]}. If I(S) = f , then we are done. Otherwise, it must be the case that
. By the semantics of Σ it follows that for every d ∈ D, we have I
} is strongly unsatisfiable as well.
} is also strongly unsatisfiable. Let I be an arbitrary interpretation. We have either
In the first case, we are done. In the second case, we may assume that I(S ∪{t 1 ≈ t 2 }) = f , which implies that I(t 1 ≈ t 2 ) = f , which in turn implies that I(t 1 ≈ t 2 ) = t. But then we have
Cut: Assume that S is satisfiable. This means that there exists an interpretation I with I(S) = t. Since I(A) ∈ {f , e, t}, it must be the case that I(B) = t for one of {¬A, ¬(#A), A}. This implies that I(S ∪ {B}) = t, so that S ∪ {B} is satisfiable. Assume that { S ∪ R ⊢ ⊥, X 1 ⊢ ⊥, . . . , X n ⊢ ⊥ } is a set of sequents that strongly represents some property P. Then
Proof. First assume that P is true. By Definition 2.13, S ∪R and X 1 , . . . , X n are strongly unsatisfiable. It follows from Theorem 2.19 that all S ∪ R 1 , . . . , S ∪ R p are strongly unsatisfiable. Hence S ∪ R 1 ⊢ ⊥, . . . , S ∪ R p ⊢ ⊥, X 1 ⊢ ⊥, . . . , X n ⊢ ⊥ strongly represents P.
Now assume that P is false. By Definition 2.13, one of S ∪ R or X 1 , . . . , X n is satisfiable. If it is one of the X 1 , . . . , X n , then we are done. Otherwise, by Theorem 2.19, one of S ∪ R 1 , . . . , S ∪ R p is satisfiable, so that in both cases,
At this point we have completed the treatment of Seq P CL . We included it in this paper, because of its close relation to the theorem proving techniques that we introduce in the next section. In fact, the observation that a sequent calculus can be based on strong representation is a direct consequence of the development of theorem proving techniques for P CL.
Example 2.21. We want to prove that the context of Example 2.9 is strongly valid. First define:
The sequent expansion consists of the following sequents:
The last two sequents in the second column originate from M ϑ (s). It created two sequents because it is a theorem.
All sequents are provable. We give a proof of
We have to apply Σ-introduction, which introduces an eigenvariable for x. This results in the sequent
We apply ⊕-introduction. The left sequent A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , ¬#H(y) ⊢ ⊥ has an easy proof, which uses only A 0 and ¬#H(y). The right sequent equals
We apply ⊗-introduction, which results in
The last formula ¬#G(y) ⊕ ¬#M (y), so that we end up with the sequents
Both sequents are easily provable. The first proof uses A 1 , and the second uses A 2 .
Kleening
In the previous section, we introduced the sequent calculus Seq P CL . If one wants to establish validity of a context Γ , one first has to construct its sequent expansion Seq( Γ ). After that, the resulting sequents can be proven by the rules in Figure 7 . Because the deduction rules can be applied only on Kleene operators, the PCL operators have to be replaced by Kleene operators during proof search, which has to be done by the replacement rules in Figure 6 . We have shown that these replacements can be applied on the top level of formulas because they preserve strong representation of strong validity of the original context Γ .
In the current section, we will show that there is no need to restrict application of the rules of Figure 6 to the top level of formulas. This makes it possible to remove all PCL operators from a formula before reasoning starts. We call this process Kleening. After that, we show that can be further used to tranform Kleene formulas into a form that is almost classical logic. We call this transformation radicalization. This transformation is not only an essential part of theorem proving procedures for PCL, it also clarifies the relation between PCL, Kleene logic and classical logic. In particular, radicalization shows that Kleene logic is almost the same as classical logic, which can be interpreted as: Although Kleene logic has more truth values than classical logic, its operators are not changed. As a consequence, one can express definedness/undefinedness in Kleene logic, but there is no mechanism that checks that only defined values are used. If one assumes an ill-typed axiom in Kleene logic, it will be possible to derive consequences from it, which is impossible in PCL.
We turn our attention to Kleening. Kleening is possible, because nearly all operators are ≤-monotone. • If A 1 B 1 and A 2 B 2 , then
•
Proof. The propositional operators can be checked by truth tables. We give proofs for the two quantifiers ∀ and Π. The other two quantifiers can be checked by using the fact that ∃x
It can be easily seen that # is not monotone: For example, one has E ⊤, but not #E #⊤. Since we have now established that the rules in Figure 6 are not restricted to the top level of a formula, we can use them to fully rewrite a formula into its normal form. This leads to the following definition: Definition 3.2. For a formula A in PCL (possibly mixed with Kleene opera-tors), we define the Kleening, Kl(A), as follows:
The additional function Kl # is used on formulas that are inside the scope of #. Using Theorem 2.18 and Theorem 3.1, the following is easy to prove:
Definition 3.4. We say that a formula A is in Kleene logic if it contains only logical operators from ⊥, ⊤, E, ¬, #, ⊗, ⊕, Π, Σ (and ≈), and the operator # is applied only on non-equality atoms.
It is easily checked that the results of Kl(A) and Kl # (A) are always in Kleene logic. The rules for Kl( A ↔ B ), Kl # ( A B ), and Kl # ( [A]B ) may cause an exponential increase in size of the formula. This problem can be avoided by using suitable subformula replacement rules, which are out of the scope of the current paper.
During the rest of the tranformation, it is convenient to push negation inwards as far as possible. This has the advantage that the polarity of non-trivial subformulas is always positive, which will simplify the remaining transformations.
Definition 3.5. Let A be a Kleene formula. We say that A is in negation normal form (NNF) if negation is applied only on atoms and on formulas of form #p(t 1 , . . . , t n ). Definition 3.6. We recursively define a function NNF = NNF + , which transforms a formula into negation normal form:
Before we continue, we give two examples:
Example 3.7. We Kleene some of the formulas in Example 2.21. We start with
The NNF of this formula equals Σx ⊥.
We have Kl(
Example 3.8. We apply Kleening and compute the negation normal form of each of the formulas in Example 2.21.
As a consequence, a PCL context can be translated into a set of sequents in Kleene logic, which strongly represents its strong validity. Kleening has a surprising feature, namely that it forgets type information.
Example 3.9. Consider
The formulas were different in PCL, but Kleening has widened them into the same formula. The formulas still have different meanings in PCL, because the Kleenings of the ¬#C i differ. The formula ¬#C i occurs in the sequent that represents the type correctness of C i .
The observation that Kleening removes type information can be reformulated as: Once a formula has been type checked, its type information can be forgotten. Alternatively, one can say: A typechecked formula can be considered equivalent to its Kleening. We will see later in this section, that Kleene logic is very close to classical logic, and that in most cases, the Kleene translation can be assumed to be in classical logic. In that case, one obtains: Once a PCL formula has been type checked, it can be replaced by its relativization in classical logic. This applies to all of the examples in Section 1. Note that this does not mean that type checking can be avoided in general, because there also exist formulas that will fail type checking.
Kleene logic is still three-valued. We will now show that widening can be further continued up to a point where one almost obtains classical logic. The following definition prepares for this procedure, in which every atom in a Kleene formula will be replaced by a modified atom that always has a definite truth value (a truth value in {f , t}). This can be done without loosing strong representation, because it is a widening step. Definition 3.10. For each predicate symbol p with arity n, we define the following abbreviations:
The following can be easily proven: Theorem 3.11. For every atom p(t 1 , . . . , t n ), for every λ ⊆ {f , e, t}, for every interpretation I, we have I(p λ (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = t iff I(p(t 1 , . . . , t n )) ∈ λ, and I(p λ (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = f otherwise.
It follows from Theorem 3.11 that one always has I(p λ (t 1 , . . . , t n )) ∈ {f , t}. Definition 3.12. Let A be a Kleene formula in NNF. We recursively define the radicalization Rad(A) of A as follows:
Radicalization is called 'radicalization' because in the resulting formula, every non-atomic subformula always has a definite truth value. This has a surprising consequence, namely there is no need to use Kleene operators anymore. In the resulting formula, each Kleene operator can be replaced by its corresponding classical (or PCL) operator without changing the truth value of the formula. This implies that in the last four rules of the definition of Rad, one could have used ∧, ∨, ∀, ∃ instead of ⊗, ⊕, Π, Σ. Proof. First check (by case analysis) that
After that, apply Theorem 3.1.
We give an example of radicalization:
Example 3.14. Radicalizing the formulas in Example 3.8 gives:
The resulting sequents still strongly represent strong validity of the context in Example 2.9.
At this point, we are close enough to classical logic, so that it is possible to define a resolution procedure in the standard way. One can Skolemize the radicalized sequents, factor them into clausal normal form, and apply resolution between atoms p λ (t 1 , . . . , t n ) and p µ (u 1 , . . . , u n ), when λ ∩ µ = ∅, and the t i are unifiable with u i . Since we are interested in geometric logic, for reasons that were explained in [9] , we will develope a theorem proving procedure for geometric logic in the remaining section of this paper. In Section 6 we will describe the remaining transformation from radicalized sequents into geometric logic.
In the remainder of the current section, we will discuss the relation between radicalized formulas and classical logic. We start by observing the following fact:
Theorem 3.15. For every Kleene formula A that is in NNF, for every interpretation I, we have I(Rad(A)) = t implies I(A) = t.
Proof. The theorem can be easily proven by induction. For the base cases, we have the following implications, which can be proven using Theorem 3.11: t (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = t ⇒ I ( #p(t 1 , . . . , t n )) = t, I( p e (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = t ⇒ I ( ¬#p(t 1 , . . . , t n )) = t,
The induction steps for the remaining operators are trivial.
It follows from Theorem 3.15 and Theorem 3.13 that I(Rad(A)) = t ⇔ I(A) = t, so that, if one uses Kleene logic in the traditional way for satisfiability testing, then it is hardly more expressive than classical logic. The only difference is that Kleene logic has more interpretations, so that it is easier to make formula true. This can only happen if the formula contains occurrences of ¬#p(t 1 , . . . , t n ).
Lemma 3.16. Let A be a Kleene formula in NNF. If A does not contain a subformula of form ¬#p(t 1 , . . . , t n ), then Rad(A) is satisfiable in a two-valued interpretation iff Rad(A) is satisfiable in a three-valued interpretation.
An example of a set of formulas that is satisfiable in a three-valued interpretation, but not in a two-valued interpretation is the set {A f ,t , Ae ⊕ B e }. This set originates from radicalizing the sequent {#A, ¬#(A ∧ B)} ⊢ ⊥, which results from the incorrect assumption that type correctness of A implies type correctness of #(A ∧ B).
Atoms of form ¬#p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) rarely occur in formulas that were introduced by an E ϑ ( Γ , i) of Definition 2.12. These are the sequents that correspond to the correctness of a theorem. Atoms of this mostly occur in sequents that originate from type checking assumptions and theorems. It follows that most theorems, once they have been type checked, become equivalent to their relativizations into classical logic.
In Example 3.8, the last sequent A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 , G ⊢ ⊥, which corresponds to correctness of the theorem M ϑ (s), does not contain a subformula of form ¬#p(t 1 , . . . , t n ), while all of the other sequents do, with the exception of B 0 ⊢ ⊥. The reason that B 0 does not contain a formula of this form is the fact that Kl replaced ¬##H(x) by ⊥.
In our view, the examples and Lemma 3.16 show that Kleene logic does not have much advantage over classical logic, when the application is based on satisfiability checking only. In [4] , Kleene logic is used in a more sophisticated way that is related to PCL, and with a similar philosophy: Formulas in which preconditions are violated should never be allowed to denote. This is obtained by introducing two levels: The first level contains only total predicates, and is used to define the preconditions of functions and predicates on the second level. The second level, which contains the theory of interest, is allowed to contain partial functions and predicates, but the preconditions must be expressible by formulas of the first level. Before the second level is considered, all preconditions must be proven in the theory of the first level. After the preconditions have been checked, by monotonicity of Kleene logic, the second level theory can be treated as a standard, two-valued theory. PCL is more expressive than the approach in [4] in two ways: First, in [4] , preconditions in the second level must always have definitions in the first level, which makes that preconditions are always eliminable from the theory. In PCL, it is possible to reason about preconditions involving assumed predicates that have no definitions, like e.g. in the theory #A → #(A∨B), which is false in the interpretation I(A) = t, I(B) = e. In [4] , #A and #B would have to be concrete predicates, which have to be provable. It is not possible to assume that a type condition is true. The second difference is that PCL has an unlimited number of levels of type dependencies, as can be seen from Figure 2 , where( (−) depends on ≤, which in turn depends on N. In [4] , at most two levels are possible.
Three-Valued Geometric Logic
Geometric logic for theorem proving was introduced in [5] . The proof search algorithm for geometric logic is closely related to model generation (see [15] ) or to proof search based on hyper tableaux (see [3] ). In [9] , we introduced a variant of geometric logic, in which function symbols are replaced by predicates, which is able to deal directly with equality, and which uses learning. The search algorithm is similar to the algorithm in [6] . Whenever the algorithm encounters an existential quantifier, it first tries all existing domain elements as possible witness. If this does not succeed, it extends the model with a new domain element. The difference is that our method replaces function symbols by predicate symbols, and that it relies on lemma learning during search.
We will adapt the strategy of [9] to Kleene logic. As a starting point, consider propositional 2-valued geometric logic. Formulas have form A 1 ∧· · ·∧A p → B 1 ∨ · · · ∨ B q , where A 1 , . . . , A p , B 1 , . . . , B q are atoms. An interpretation is a finite set of atoms. The search algorithm starts with the empty interpretation I = {}. During search, it checks for geometric formulas A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A p → B 1 ∨ · · · ∨ B q , s.t. all A i ∈ I, but no B j ∈ I. If no such formula exists, then a model is found. Otherwise, it backtracks through all of the interpretations I ∪ {B j }. If backtracking exhausts all possibilities, then the algorithm reports that the set of geometric formulas is unsatisfiable.
The search algorithm treats f and t differently. Atoms that do not occur in the interpretation, are false by default. In a formula, the atoms on the left hand side are passive, which means that they are waiting until they occur in the interpretation. The atoms on the right hand side are active, which means that they are able to extend the interpretation, when this is necessary. This asymmetry is useful in many practical problems, because problems are often sparse, which means that only a few atoms are true in them.
In Kleene logic, the distinction between passive and active atoms will be more complicated, due to the presence of a third truth value. One first has to decide which truth value will be the default. Both f and e are reasonable candidates.
We choose f , because type predicates are naturally false, because it is natural to assume that a given object does not belong to a given type, unless it has to, and also relational translations of functions are naturally false, because functionality restricts them from being true too often. As a consequence, interpretations will list the atoms whose truth assignment is not f . Because there are two possibilities, truth values have to be stored in the interpretation as well.
Inside the formulas, the distinction between passive and active atoms cannot be maintained. An atom of form A e must be able to extend the interpretation, when it is required, but it must also be able to detect a conflict when A t is added to the interpretation by another formula. Consider for example the formulas A f ∨ B e and A f ∨ B t , and the interpretation I = {A t }. Looking at the first formula, the atom A f is inconsistent with I, so that we add B e to I. Now in the second formula, both A f and B t have become inconsistent with I, so that the interpretation is closed, and we have to backtrack. If we would have considered the second formula first, then B t would have extended the interpretation, and B e would have been in conflict with it. It follows that atoms of form B e or B t can play either a passive or an active role. Atoms of form B f , B f ,e , B f ,t are always passive, because they are true when no atom of B e or B t is present in the interpretation. 1. An atom p λ (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are variables, not necessarily distinct, and λ = {f }, {e}, {t}, {f , e} or {f , t}.
2. An equality atom x 1 ≈ x 2 , with x 1 , x 2 distinct variables.
3. An existentially quantified atom Σy p λ (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are variables, not necessarily distinct, and λ = {e} or {t}. There must be at least one occurrence of y among the x i .
We will usually write Σy p λ (x 1 , . . . , x n , y), even when y does not have to be at the last position, and there can be more than one occurrence of y.
A geometric formula is a formula of form Πx A 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ A p , where each A i is a geometric atom with all its free variables among x. It is not required that A i contains all variables of x.
The term 'geometric atom' is slightly misleading because an object of form ∃y p λ (x 1 , . . . , x n , y) is not an atom. We think that it is sufficiently close to an atom, so that it can still be called 'atom'. The search procedure is an adaptation of the procedure of [9] for classical logic. It is defined in two stages: The first stage is a simple backtracking procedure, that backtracks through all possible interpretations. The second stage is obtained by adding lemma learning to the procedure of the first stage. The addition of lemma learning is essential for obtaining an efficient strategy. In order to define the first stage, we need to define interpretations. We first define the domain elements of the interpretations. Definition 4.2. We assume a countably infinite set of domain elements E. Definition 4.3. A ground substitution Θ is a partial function from variables to E. If A is a geometric atom, all whose free variables are defined in Θ, then AΘ is the result of replacing each free variable x by its corresponding xΘ.
We call the atoms that can be obtained in this way ground atoms.
As with 'geometric atom', the term 'ground atom' is not completely correct, because 'ground atoms' are not always ground, and also not always atoms, but we think they are close enough. Definition 4.4. An interpretation is a pair (E, M ) in which E ⊆ E is a set of elements, and M is a set of ground atoms of form p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n ), s.t. λ = e or λ = t, and all e i ∈ E. It is not allowed that M contains a conflicting pair of form p e (e 1 , . . . , e n ), p t (e 1 , . . . , e n ).
An interpretation stores the ground atoms that have truth assignments different from the default value f . Using this semantics, one can define when a ground atom is true in an interpretation. An atom of form p t (e) is true in M if p t (e) occurs in M. An atom of form p f (e) is true in M, if both of p e (e) and p t (e) do not occur in M. An atom of form p f ,t (e) is true in M if p e (e) does not occur in M.
When an atom is not true in an interpretation, there are two possibilities: Either it can be made true by extending M, or it can be made true only by making M smaller. In the second case, we call the atom in conflict with M. Definition 4.5. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation. Let A be a ground atom with all its elements in E. We say that A is false in (E, M ) if one of the following holds:
1. A has form e 1 ≈ e 2 and e 1 = e 2 .
2.
A has form p {λ} (e 1 , . . . , e n ), λ = f , and M does not contain p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n ).
3.
A has form p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n ), f ∈ λ, and M contains an atom of form p µ (e 1 , . . . , e n ) with µ ∈ λ.
4.
A has form Σy p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n , y) with λ = {e}, {t}, and there is no e ∈ E, s.t. p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n , e) occurs in M.
We say that A is true in (E, M ) if A is not false in (E, M ). We say that A is in conflict with (E, M ) if one of the following holds:
2.
A has form p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n ), and M contains an atom of form p µ (e 1 , . . . , e n ) with µ ∈ λ.
It can be seen from Definition 4.5 that an atom of form Σy p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n , y) is never in conflict with an interpretation. This is because it is always possible to add a new element e to E, and to add p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n , e) to M. It is easily shown that a conflict atom is always false: Lemma 4.6. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation. Let A be a ground atom all whose elements occur in E. If A is in conflict with (E, M ), then A is false in (E, M ).
It is also easy to show that the only way of repairing a conflict is by backtracking:
Lemma 4.7. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation. Let A be a ground atom all whose elements occur in E. If A is in conflict with (E, M ), then A is also in conflict with every interpretation
If an atom is false in an interpretation, but not in conflict, then it can be made true by extending the interpretation as follows:
Definition 4.8. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation. Let A be a ground atom with all its elements in E. Assume that A is false in (E, M ), but not in conflict with
A has form p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n ) with λ = {e}, {t}, and
. . , e n ) }).
A has form Σy p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n , y) with λ ∈ {e}, {t}, and there exists an e ∈ E, s.t
. . , e n , e) }).
3.
A has form Σy p λ (e 1 , . . . , e n , y), and there exists anê ∈ E, s.t
. . , e n ,ê) }).
In case A is existential, the relation ⇒ A is non-deterministic, because one can choose either to use an existing e ∈ E as witness, or to create a newê ∈ E. In the latter case, the actualê chosen does not matter. We will always assume that there is a fixed way of obtaining a newê ∈ E, and that only oneê will be considered.
The following lemmas states that it is always possible to extend, that atoms made true by extension will remain true, and that extension is the smallest modification that makes an atom true.
Lemma 4.9. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation. Let A be a ground atom all whose elements are in E. Assume that A is false in (E, M ), but not in conflict with (E, M ). Then the following hold:
A is true in every interpretation
(E ′ , M ′ ) for which (E, M ) ⇒ A (E ′ , M ′ ), and in every interpretation (E ′′ , M ′′ ), s.t. E ′ ⊆ E ′′ and M ′ ⊆ M ′′ .
For every interpretation (E
Note that part 3 implies that false atoms that are not in conflict, cannot be made true by backtracking. Definition 4.10. Let F = Πx A 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ A p be a geometric formula. Let Θ be a ground substitution that is defined for all variables in x. We say that F is false in (E, M ) with Θ, if all instantiated atoms A i Θ are false in (E, M ).
We say that F conflicts (E, M ) with Θ if each of its instantiated atoms A i Θ is in conflict with (E, M ). In that case, we call F a conflict formula of (E, M ).
Using extension, we define the first search algorithm. It tries to extend an interpretation (E, M ) into an interpretation (E ′ , M ′ ) that makes all formulas true with every ground substitution.
At each stage, the algorithm looks for a formula F and a substitution Θ, s.t. F Θ is false in the current interpretation. If no F and Θ are found, then (E, M ) is a satisfying interpretation. If F is a conflict formula, then the algorithm fails, and it backtracks. If F is not a conflict formula, then the algorithm backtracks through all possible extensions (E ′ , M ′ ), based on an atom A of F that is false, but not in conflict with (E, M ).
Definition 4.11. Algorithm S t (G, E, M ) is called with a set of geometric formulas G and an interpretation (E, M ). It tries to extend the interpretation into an interpretation (E
, that makes all geometric formulas in G true. If no such interpretation exists, it returns ⊥.
If such an extension exists, it either returns an interpretation
in which all G are true, or it does not terminate. S t (G, E, M ) is defined by case analysis:
MODEL: If for all formulas F ∈ G all ground instances F Θ that use only elements in E, are true in (E, M ), then S t (G, E, M ) returns (E, M ).
SELECT: Otherwise, G contains at least one formula F, for which there exists a substitution Θ, s.t. F Θ is false in (E, M ). Let A 1 , . . . , A m be the atoms in F Θ that are not in conflict with (E, M ). Select an F and a Θ, for which m is minimal.
FAIL: If m = 0, then F is a conflict formula, and S t (G, E, M ) returns ⊥.
, do the following:
If r is an interpretation, then return r.
If we reached the end, we know that all recursive calls returned ⊥. In that case, S t (G, E, M ) also returns ⊥.
Theorem 4.12. Let G be a set of geometric formulas. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation, s.t. for every formula F ∈ G, every instance F Θ is true in (E, M ).
Proof. Algorithm S t is non-deterministic. It is possible that it runs in accordance with (E, M ), but it doesn't have to, because it may enter another, possibly infinite branch. We show that it is impossible that it returns ⊥. Suppose that S t (G, E 0 , M 0 ) returns ⊥. We will derive a contradiction. Let (E i , M i ) be the biggest interpretation with
Certainly MODEL did not apply, because in that case, S t (G, E 0 , M 0 ) would have returned (E i , M i ). This means that SELECT was entered. Let F, Θ be the formula and the substitution that were selected. Since F Θ is true in (E, M ), there must be a literal A in F Θ, that is true in (E, M ). It follows from Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 that A is not in conflict with (E i , M i ). As a consequence, S t (G, E i , M i ) will not enter FAIL, and A will be among the A i . It follows from Lemma 4.9, part 3, that there exists an interpretation (
Next we prove completeness. In order to do this, we show that when S t (G, E, M ) does not return ⊥, it either constructs or approximates a model. In the proof, we need the assumption that SELECT selects in a fair fashion. Theorem 4.13. Let G be a set of geometric formulas. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation. Assume that S t (G, E, M ) does not return ⊥. Then there exists an
Proof. If S t (G, E, M ) returns through MODEL with interpretation (E ′ , M ′ ), then the theorem is trivially true. Otherwise, the algorithm runs forever. By König's Lemma, it must pass through an infinite sequence of interpretations
We show that for every formula F in G, for every ground substitution Θ with range in E ω , the instance F Θ is true in (E ω , M ω ).
Let F, Θ be a formula and a ground substitution with range in E, s.t. F Θ is false in (E ω , M ω ). We will derive a contradiction. The atoms in F Θ can be separated into the atoms A 1 , . . . , A m that are not in conflict with (E ω , M ω ), and the atoms B 1 , . . . , B n that are in conflict with (E ω , M ω ).
For every B j , there must exist an interpretation (E kj , M kj ), s.t. B j is in conflict with (E kj , M kj ). Let k be the maximum of the k j , which must exist because the number of possible B j is finite. Since A 1 , . . . , A m are false in (E ω , M ω ), but not in conflict with it, it follows from Lemma 4.9, part 3, that A 1 , . . . , A m are false in every interpretation (E i , M i ). By fairness, there must exist a k ′ ≥ k, s.t. F and Θ were selected by
would have entered FAIL, which contradicts the assumption that (E 1 , M 1 ) , . . . , (E i , M i ), . . . is an infinite branch. 
by EXTENSION through one of the A j . This implies, using Lemma 4.9, that A j is true in every extension of (E k ′ +1 , M k ′ +1 ), so that it is true in (E ω , M ω ). This contradicts the assumption that F Θ is false in (E ω , M ω ).
This ends the description of the first algorithm. In the next section, we will add learning to S t . We end the current section with an example. 
). This formula can be factored into the first three geometric formulas in Figure 8 . Kleening the second formula results in ¬#A ⊕ (A ⊗ ¬#B). Radicalization results in A e ⊕ (A t ⊗ B e ). This formula can be factored into the last two formulas in Figure 8 .
We try to refute the set of formulas using algorithm S t . We start with interpretation (E 0 , M 0 ), defined by E 0 = {} and M 0 = {}. Since the example is propositional, we will ignore the ground substitutions. All formulas are true in (E 0 , M 0 ), except for the last two formulas A e ⊕ A t and A e ⊕ B e .
Both formulas are not in conflict with (E 0 , M 0 ). In the formula A e ⊕ A t , both atoms A e and A t are false in (E 0 , M 0 ) but not in conflict with (E 0 , M 0 ).
We continue search with (E 1 , M 1 ) = ({}, {A e }). Now the first formula A f ,t is false in (E 1 , M 1 ) and it is in conflict with (E 1 , M 1 ).
We backtrack and enter the other branch, which results in (E 2 , M 2 ) = ({}, {A t }). All formulas are true in (E 2 , M 2 ), except for the last formula A e ⊕ B e .
Atom A e is in conflict with (E 2 , M 2 ). The other atom B e is false in (E 2 , M 2 ), but not in conflict. We have
The resulting interpretation is (E 3 , M 3 ) = ({}, {A t , B e }). Now the second clause A f ⊕ B f ,t is false in (E 3 , M 3 ), and it is in conflict with (E 3 , M 3 ).
Since we have exhausted all possibilities, we have shown that the set of formulas is unsatisfiable.
In the next section we give a non-propositional example, in which existential quantification will be used.
Lemma Generation
In [9] , model search was combined with lemma generation in order to avoid that similar work will be repeated by the search algorithm. In this section, we will show that this is also possible with geometric Kleene logic. Lemma generation for geometric logic works in the same way as for propositional logic. (See [17] , [11] , [16] ). Whenever the search algorithm closes a branch, it constructs a conflict lemma that will prevent that a similar branch will be explored in the future. In the DPLL algorithm, the lemma is constructed by propositional resolution. In geometric logic, the lemma is constructed by rules that are related to predicate resolution. We call the improved algorithm S m (G, E, M ). It is similar to S t (G, E, M ), but it always creates a conflict formula when it backtracks. The conflict formulas are derived by the following deduction rules:
Definition 5.1. We define disjunction resolution and existential resolution:
be two geometric formulas. Assume that n > 0, and that for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have λ ∩ µ j = ∅.
Further assume that the atoms p(x) and p(y 1 ), . . . , p(y n ) are simultaneously unifiable. Let Λ be a most general unifier. Then the formula
is a disjunction resolvent of F and G.
Existential Resolution: Let F = Πx Φ(x) ⊕ Σy p λ (x, y) with y ∈ x be a geometric formula.
be a geometric formula for which v ∩ z = ∅, and for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we have λ ∩ µ j = ∅.
Assume that there exists a unifier that simultaneously unifies p(x, y) with all p (z 1 , v 1 ) , . . . , p(z m , v m ), which merges y with all variables in v, but which does not merge y with a variable from x or z.
Let Λ be a most general unifier.
Disjunction resolution is closely related to standard resolution. The description of existential resolution is admittedly awkward, but the rule is complicated and we are unfortunately not aware of a simpler way of describing it. In combination with a quantifier, the notation x means the set of variables being quantified over. The expression Φ(x) denotes a Kleene disjunction with all its variables among x, but which does not necessarily contain all variables from x. The notation p λ (x i ) denotes a geometric atom, built using variables from x, but not necessarily containing all variables from x. The notation x i denotes a single, arbitrary variable from x. Variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . may be distinct or the same. We give an example of disjunction resolution:
Example 5.2. Geometric formulas Πxy A f (x, y)⊕B t (x, y) and Πxyz B f ,e (x, y)⊕ B e (x, z) ⊕ C t (x, y, z) resolve into Πxy A t (x, y) ⊕ C t (x, y, y).
Next we give a sequence of examples of existential resolution, with increasing complexity:
Example 5.3. Let F be the formula Πxy A f (x, y)⊕Σz B t (x, y, z) . We will show how different formulas G 1 , . . . , G 4 resolve with F using existential resolution.
In its simplest form, existential resolution is almost the same as disjunction resolution. The formula G 1 = Πxyv B e (x, y, v) ⊕ C f (x, y) can resolve with F, which results in Πxy A f (x, y) ⊕ C f (x, y) . G 1 contains a variable v, that is matched with the existentially quantified variable z in F. It can occur only on positions that match the occurrence of z in F. Trying to resolve F with Πxy B e (x, y, y) ⊕ C f (x, y) would be incorrect. The formula G 2 = Πxyv B e (x, y, v) ⊕ x ≈ v ⊕ C f (x, y) contains one equality involving v. In case x ≈ v holds, the atom B e (x, y, v) need not be true. Hence, we cannot completely resolve Σz B t (x, y, z) away. We have to keep the instances of B t (x, y, v) where x = v. This gives rise to the existential resolvent
It is possible that the second formula contains more than one variable matching into the existential variable. In formula
Finally, there is a special case where no literal matching B t (x, y, z) is present in the second formula. This form of existential resolution is called 'degenerated' in [9] . An example is the formula G 4 = Πxyv x ≈ v ⊕ C f (x, y) which can resolve with F either into
The following theorem states that it is always possible, after all alternatives have failed, to construct a conflict formula for the interpretation that we tried to extend.
Theorem 5.4. Let F be a geometric formula. Let (E, M ) be an interpretation, and let Θ be a ground substitution, such that F Θ is false in (E, M ).
. . , A m are the atoms whose instances A i Θ are not in conflict with (E, M ), and all atoms in Φ(x)Θ are in conflict with (E, M ).
Assume that for every A j , for every interpretation
, we have a conflict formula. Then it is possible to derive, using disjunction resolution and existential resolution, a conflict formula of (E, M ).
Since Theorem 5.4 is important, but rather complicated, we give an example. The example uses the formulas of Example 5.3.
Example 5.5. Let the interpretation (E, M ) be defined by E = {e 0 , e 1 }, M = {A t (e 0 , e 1 ), C t (e 0 , e 1 )}. Let F = Πxy A f (x, y) ⊕ Σz B t (x, y, z) be as in Example 5.3. Assuming Θ = {x := e 0 , y := e 1 }, the instance F Θ is false in (E, M ). e 1 ) , B t (e 0 , e 1 , e 0 ) } E 1 = {e 0 , e 1 } M 1 = { A t (e 0 , e 1 ), C t (e 0 , e 1 ), B t (e 0 , e 1 , e 1 ) } E 2 = {e 0 , e 1 , e 2 } M 2 = { A t (e 0 , e 1 ), C t (e 0 , e 1 ), B t (e 0 , e 1 , e 2 ) } Using recursive calls, algorithm S m (G, E, M ) will collect conflict formulas for the interpretations
Construction of the conflict formula for (E, M ) starts from the conflict formula for (E 2 , M 2 ). It has a special form, because of the new element e 2 .
Let G be the conflict formula that was found for (E 2 , M 2 ). There exists a substitution Θ ′ , s.t. each atom in GΘ ′ is in conflict with (E 2 , M 2 ). If there is no variable v in G, for which vΘ ′ = e 2 , then each atom in GΘ ′ is also in conflict with (E, M ), so that we have a conflict formula for (E, M ). We can therefore assume that e 2 is used by Θ ′ . For simplicity, we assume that G contains a single variable v with vΘ ′ = e 2 . If there are more variables, they can be merged. Since the only occurrence of e 2 is in the atom B t (e 0 , e 1 , e 2 ), variable v can occur only in atoms of form B λ (x i , x j , v) with t ∈ λ, or of form x i ≈ v. If an atom A containing v would have another form, the instance AΘ ′ would not be in conflict with (E 2 , M 2 ).
Consider
The assignment v := e 2 can be changed to v := e 0 or v := e 1 , which would make B f (x, y, v)Θ ′ in conflict with B t (e 0 , e 1 , e 0 ) or B t (e 0 , e 1 , e 1 ). Since G 1 does contain any other atoms involving v, it follows that G 1 is also a conflict formula of (E 0 , M 0 ) and (E 1 , M 1 ). This is reflected by the fact that F and G 1 can resolve into Πxy A f (x, y) ⊕ C f (x, y), which is a conflict formula of (E, M ) under the substitution {x := e 0 , y := e 1 }.
Next consider G 2 = Πxyv B e (x, y, v)⊕x ≈ v ⊕C f (x, y). In G 2 , the variable v additionally occurs in the equality x ≈ v. It is still a conflict formula of (E 2 , M 2 ) with substitution Θ ′ . G 2 can also be used as conflict formula for (E 1 , M 1 ) by changing the assignment of v to v := e 1 . It cannot be used as conflict formula for (E 0 , M 0 ), because assigning v := e 0 makes the equality true.
The existential resolvent of F and G 2 , Πxy A f (x, y) ⊕ C f (x, y) ⊕ B t (x, y, x) reflects this fact. In order to obtain a conflict clause for (E, M ), the atom B t (x, y, x) needs to be resolved away. This is possible if we have a conflict formula for (E 0 , M 0 ). Assume that H = Πxy x ≈ y ⊕ B f (x, y, x) is such a conflict formula with substitution {x := e 0 , y := e 1 }. Using disjunction resolution, one obtains Πxy A f (x, y) ⊕ C f (x, y) ⊕ x ≈ y, which is a conflict clause for (E, M ).
Example 5.5 shows the general pattern how existential resolution is used. When S m (G, E, M ) encounters an existential quantifier, it has to find a witness. It first tries the existing elements e 0 , . . . , e n−1 . If they all fail to produce a satisfying interpretation, it tries a new element e n . If this also fails, it has conflict formulas for all e 0 , . . . , e n . The conflict formula for e n is resolved with the formula that contains the existential quantifier. The form of the resolvent depends on the inequalities that occur the conflict formula for e n . For every inequality, it contains an additional atom that prevents it from being a conflict formula. The additional atoms are resolved away with disjunction resolution. We now give the proof:
Proof. Theorem 5.4 is proven by induction. Some care has to be given to finding a suitable measure. Existential resolution involving an atom of form Σy B λ (x, y) may possibly create a new formula containing different atoms of form B λ (x, x i ), which have to be resolved away by disjunction resolution.
Let CLOS(F, Θ) abbreviate the property: It is possible to derive from F and Θ a formula F ′ and substitution Θ ′ , s.t. every atom in F ′ Θ ′ is in conflict with (E, M ). We prove CLOS(F, Θ) by induction as follows: If F Θ is not by itself in conflict with (E, M ), we derive a new F ′ using disjunction resolution or existential resolution from F in combination with a conflict formula for one of the extensions of (E, M ). The new formula F ′ either contains strictly less existential atoms than F, or it contains the same number of existential atoms, but the number of atoms A for which AΘ is false in (E, M ) but not in conflict, has decreased. Write F in the form Πx Φ ⊕ A 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ A m as in the statement of the theorem. We will resolve A m away.
• If A m is an existential atom, then it has form Σy p λ (x, y) with λ ∈ {e, t}.
Since (E, M ) ⇒ AmΘ (Ê,M ), and we have assumed existence of a conflict formula for every extension of (E, M ), there must exist a formulaĈ and a ground substitutionΘ, s.t. every atom inĈΘ is in conflict with (Ê,M ). We can assume thatĈ and A m have no variables in common.
The variables ofĈ can be partitioned into v and z, where v ∈ v iff vΘ =ê, and v ∈ z otherwise. It is clear from the construction that v and z are disjoint. The atoms inĈ can be partitioned into those that contain a variable from v, and those that do not. Using this,Ĉ can be written in the form Πz v Ψ(z) ⊕ Ψ ′ (z, v). For every atom A ∈ Ψ(z), it must be the case that AΘ is a conflict atom of (E, M ).
If v is empty, thenĈ is already a conflict formula of (E, M ), so that we have established CLOS(F, Θ) with (Ĉ,Θ).
Since every atom A in Ψ ′ (z, v) contains variables from v, every AΘ must containê. This implies that there are only two types of atom in Ψ ′ (z, v), namely atoms of form v ≈ z with v ∈ v, z ∈ z, and atoms of form
This implies thatĈ can be written in the form
where zΘ does not containê, and vΘ = {ê}.
Because the substitution Θ ∪{y :=ê} ∪Θ merges the p(z i , v i ) with p(x, y), it is clear that p(x, y) and the p(z i , v i ) have a simultaneous most general unifier Λ. From the definition of mgu, it follows that there exists a substitution Θ R , s.t. Λ · Θ R = Θ ∪ {y :=ê} ∪Θ.
Since vΘ = {ê} andê ∈ zΘ, it follows that Λ does not unify a variable in v with a variable in z. Since yΛ =ê as well, it also does not unify y with a variable in z. It is also not possible that Λ unifies y with a variable in x, because Θ matches xΘ ⊆ E.
At this point, we know that it is possible to construct the existential
We will use CLOS(R, Θ R ) as induction hypothesis. It is clear that R contains one existential literal less than C, becauseĈ does not contain existential literals.
We have to show that for every atom A of R, either AΘ R is in conflict with (E, M ), or for every interpretation (
If A is in Φ(x)Λ, then there exists a B in Φ(x), s.t. A = BΛ. Since AΘ R = BΛΘ R = BΘ, and BΘ is in conflict with (E, M ), it follows that AΘ R is in conflict with (E, M ).
If A is in Ψ(z)Λ, then there exists a B in Ψ(z), s.t. A = BΛ. We know that AΘ R = BΛΘ R = BΘ. We know by construction of Ψ(z) that BΘ is in conflict with (E, M ). It follows that AΘ R is in conflict with (E, M ).
If A is one of the A i Λ with i ≤ m−1, then
We assumed in the statement of the theorem that we have conflict formula for every such interpretation (E ′ , M ′ ).
Finally, if A is one of the p λ (x, z i )Λ, then AΘ R has form p λ (x, z i )ΛΘ R . Every argument position that contains the variable z i must have contained y in the original literal p λ (x, y) of F. We know by construction of z, that z i ΛΘ R = z iΘ ∈ E. Hence, there is an e ∈ E, for which we can write
, so that it it follows from the assumptions of the theorem that there exists a conflict formula.
• If A m (x) is a variable atom, then it has form p λ (x) with λ ∈ {{f }, {e}, {t}, {f , e}, {f , t}}.
It can be easily checked that f ∈ λ, implies that p λ (xΘ) is either true in (E, M ), or in conflict with (E, M ). This follows from the fact that (E, M ) contains, by Definition 4.4, either exactly one of p e (xΘ), p t (xΘ), or neither of them. This contradicts the assumption that A m is false in (E, M ) but not in conflict. Hence λ = {e} or {t}.
There is a single interpretation (E
From the assumptions of the theorem, there exists a conflict formulaĈ for (E ′ , M ′ ). LetΘ be the substitution which brings every atom A ∈ĈΘ in conflict with (E ′ , M ′ ). We can assume without loss of generality that C has no variables in common with F.
If there is no atom A ∈Ĉ, for which AΘ has form p µ (xΘ) with λ ∩ µ = ∅, thenĈ is a conflict formula of (E, M ), and we have shown CLOS(F, Θ) with (Ĉ,Θ).
Otherwise,Ĉ can be written in the formĈ = Πy Ψ(y) ⊕ p µ1 (y 1 ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ p µn (y n ), where the p µj (y j ) are the literals for which p(xΘ) = p(y jΘ ), µ i ∩ λ = ∅, and the literals in Ψ(y) are the remaining literals. It is clear that p(x) and p(y 1 ), . . . , p(y n ) can be simultaneously unified, so it is possible to construct the disjunction resolvent
By definition of mgu, there exists a ground substitution Θ R , s.t. Λ · Θ R = Θ ∪Θ.
We want to use CLOS(R, Θ R ) as induction hypothesis. First observe that every atom in Φ(x)ΛΘ R ∪ Ψ(y)ΛΘ R = Φ(x)Θ ∪ Ψ(y)Θ is in conflict with (E, M ).
Secondly, for every atom
This implies that, using the assumptions of the theorem, we have a conflict formula for every interpretation (
Finally, observe that A 1 Λ, . . . , A m−1 Λ are the atoms A of R, for which A is false in (E, M ) but not in conflict. Since m − 1 < m, we can use CLOS(R, Θ R ) as induction hypothesis.
We end the section with an example of a complete refutation by algorithm S m .
Example 5.6. Suppose that we want to use geometric Kleene logic to prove that a ≈ b implies s(a) ≈ s(b). This means that we have to prove the sequent a ≈ b, s(a) ≈ s(b) ⊢ ⊥. Using the transformations in Section 6, we obtain the following geometric formulas:
The predicate A(y) can be interpreted as y ≈ a, the predicate B(y) can be interpreted as y ≈ b, and S(x, y) can be interpreted as as s(x) ≈ y. The general method of obtaining such translations will be given in Definition 6.2.
We use algorithm S m . It starts with (E 1 , M 1 ) = ({}, {}). All formulas are true in (E 1 , M 1 ) with every substitution, except for (1) and (2) which are false with the empty substitution. Neither formula is a conflict formula. Assume that S m selects (1). Then it checks the interpretations (E 2 , M 2 ) for which (E 1 , M 1 ) ⇒ Σy At(y) (E 2 , M 2 ). It is clear that the only candidate is (E 2 , M 2 ) = ({e 0 }, {A t (e 0 )}). Proof search continues with (E 2 , M 2 ). Formula (2) is false under the empty substitution. Formula (3) is false with substitution {x := e 0 }. Neither formula is a conflict formula of (E 1 , M 1 ). Assume that S m selects (2) and the empty substitution. Then we have (
Assume that S m explores (E 3 , M 3 ) first. Formula (3) is false in (E 3 , M 3 ) with substitution Θ = {x := e 0 }, but not in conflict. All other formulas are true in
Assume that (E 4 , M 4 ) is explored first. Formula (5) is a conflict formula with substitution {α := e 0 , β := e 0 , γ := e 0 }.
Algorithm S m backtracks and explores (E 5 , M 5 ). Formula (5) is again a conflict formula, but now with substitution {α := e 0 , β := e 0 , γ := e 1 }. It follows that algorithm S m will apply existential resolution between (3) and (5), merging S(x, y) with S(α, γ) and S(β, γ). The result is Πx A f ,e (x) ⊕ B f ,e (x), which we call formula (6) . It is a conflict formula of (E 3 , M 3 ), which is consistent with Theorem 5.4. Now S m has a conflict formula for (E 3 , M 3 ), after which it will consider (E 4 , M 4 ). Formula (4) is a conflict formula with substitution {α := e 0 , β := e 1 }. Since extensions (E 3 , M 3 ) and (E 4 , M 4 ) were based on formula (2), Algorithm S m will apply disjunction resolution between (2) and (4), matching B(y) with B(β). The result is Πx A f ,e (x) ⊕ B t (x). Since formula (4) contains an equality, the resolvent is not yet a conflict formula for (E 2 , M 2 ). In order to obtain a conflict formula, S m has to apply further disjunction resolution with formula (6). The result is Πx A f ,e (x), which we will call formula (7). It is a conflict formula for (E 2 , M 2 ) with substitution {x := e 0 }. One final step of existential resolution with formula (1) yields ⊥, which is a conflict formula of ({}, {}).
Transformation to Geometric Logic
In the previous two sections we have developed a sound and complete strategy for checking satisfiability of sets of geometric Kleene formulas. It remains to provide a transformation that replaces sequents by sets of geometric formulas. When applied to a set of sequents, the transformation has to preserve strong representation. A large part of the transformation was already given in Section 3.
Applying the sequence Kl; NNF; Rad removes PCL operators, transforms into NNF, and radicalizes the atoms in the formulas, after which all logical operators in the formula can be considered classical. As a consequence, the resulting formula sets are so close to classical logic that the transformations of [9] can be used with small adaptations.
If one applies transformation Kl naively, it may cause an exponential increase in formula size. In order to avoid this, it is possible to define subformula replacement. Subformula replacement is a standard technique used in first-order logic theorem proving, in which a complex subformula of form A(x) is replaced by a new name p(x), together with a definition ∀x p(x) ↔ A(x), in which x are the free variables of A(x). For a discussion of subformula replacement techniques for first-order logic, we refer to [18] . Subformula replacement in PCL is more complicated than in first-order logic, because it has to take place before radicalization, at a point where PCL still significantly differs from classical logic. We will not discuss this further in the present paper, because of length restrictions. In the current section, a restricted form of subformula replacement will be used, which is completely standard, because it takes place after radicalization.
We now describe the rest of the transformation. The main step is the replacement of function symbols by relation symbols. The reason for doing this is that we want a procedure that is able to combine proof search with model search, which is done more naturally in a function-free setting. In order to eliminate a function symbol f with arity n, we introduce a relation symbol P f with arity n + 1. Constants are treated as function symbols with arity 0.
Example 6.1. Consider the sequent
The sequent contains two functions symbols 0 and s. We introduce a predicate symbol Z with arity 1 and a predicate symbol S with arity 2.
The resulting formulas are in geometric form, but this is not always the case.
In the last sequent, the first two formulas ensure that the introduced predicates are total. There is no need to add functionality axioms because the predicates occur only negatively in the remaining formulas. This implies that in every interpretation, the predicates can always be made functional without making any formulas false.
We now introduce the transformation formally, and prove its correctness. We call it anti-Skolemization, because it does the opposite of Skolemization. Anti-Skolemization for Kleene logic does not differ from the procedure in [9] or [2] . Definition 6.2. We assume a mapping that maps every n-arity function symbol f to a unique (n + 1)-arity predicate symbol F .
Let A be a Kleene formula that is in NNF and radicalized. An anti-Skolemization of A is a formula that is the result of making the following replacement as long as A contains functional terms:
Select a functional term f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) in which all x 1 , . . . , x n are variables. Such a term necessarily exists. It is possible that n = 0.
, where B is a subformula of A that contains at least one of the occurrences of f (
Definition 6.2 leaves some choice for heuristics in the choice of B, as is shown by the next example: Example 6.3. Consider the formula A = Πx P t (s(x)) ⊗ Q ⊗ R t (s(x)). If one chooses B = P t (s(x))⊗Q⊗R t (s(x)), then one immediately obtains Πxz S f ,e (x, z)⊕ (P t (z) ⊗ Q ⊗ R t (z)). If one first chooses B = P t (s(x)), and after that
The first method has the advantage that S f ,e (x, z) is introduced only once. It has the disadvantage that it causes Q to depend on S f ,e (x, z). The second choice does not have this problem, but it introduces S f ,e (x, z) twice. In the presence of big terms, this may lead to long, repeated sequences of atoms.
A compromise could be to take B as the largest purely disjunctive subformula that contains f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), or to factor A into clauses first, and to apply antiSkolemization on clauses only. It may also be useful to simplify formulas before anti-Skolemization.
We postpone the correctness proof, because we first want to give the complete transformation. At this point, the formulas are almost geometric. It remains to do some factoring, to do some simplifications, to substitute negative equalities away, and to rename existentially quantified subformulas that are not an atom. We define the last step of the transformation on sequents, because it can split a single formula into multiple formulas. Definition 6.4. Let S ⊢ ⊥ be a sequent containing only Kleene formulas that are in NNF, function free, and radicalized. We define the final transformation Geo that makes the formulas in S geometric: 
We will now give the correctness proofs of the transformations, where 'correct' means that the transformation preserves strong representation. Both antiSkolemization and transformation Geo extend the signature by introducing new predicate symbols. Correctness can be proven in two ways: Either one shows that the predicates have a definition, and uses the fact that definitions are conservative, or one uses the fact that there exists a predicate with the desired property, after which exists-introduction can be applied backwards. Due to the eigenvariable condition, this will introduce the predicate as a new predicate into the sequent. We will follow the second approach. Since the new symbol is a predicate symbol, we need to introduce quantification over predicates, and a corresponding introduction rule. We also add a ⊗-elimination rule to the calculus. This has the advantage that multiple formulas can be combined into a single formula.
Definition 6.5. We extend the set of formulas, that was first defined in Defition 2.1, and extended in Definitions 2.17 and 3.10 with a second order, existential, Kleene quantifier:
• If F is a formula and p is a predicate symbol that occurs in F only with a fixed arity n, then Σp F is also a formula.
Formulas of form Σp F are interpreted as follows: First define I ′ ∼ p I if for every symbol s that is not the predicate symbol p, we have I ′ (s) = I(s). Next define R P = {I ′ (P ) | I ′ ∼ p I}. Finally, define I(Σp F ) by selecting from R F the most preferred value, using the preference list for Σ in Figure 5 . We extend the calculus Seq P CL with the following deduction rules: In the first rule, predicate q must not occur in S or P [p], and it must have the same arity as p.
It easy to prove for both rules that they preserve strong representation. The first rule is the natural extension of Σ-introduction to second order. The second rule tells that there is no need to distinguish between A and B separately, and A ⊗ B combined in a Kleene conjunction.
We now prove that positive subformula replacement is widening. (See Definition 2.15) Note that we do not assume that the formula is radicalized. Theorem 6.6. Let A be a formula that may contain PCL and Kleene operators. Let B be a subformula of A that is in the scope of Π, Σ, ⊕, ⊗, but no other operators. Assume that x 1 , . . . , x n are the free variables of B. Let p be a predicate symbol of arity n that does not occur in A. Then This completes the proof.
After having shown correctness of subformula replacement, which is used as part of the transformation Geo, but which also can be used separately as optimization, it remains to prove correctness of anti-Skolemization. It is straightforward to prove that truth of a formula implies truth of its anti-Skolemization. The introduced predicates F (x, y) can be viewed as abbreviations for f (x) ≈ y. In order to show that falsehood is preserved as well, there are three possible ways to proceed: Firstly, one can apply Skolemization on the seriality axioms Πx Σy F t (x, y), which will reintroduce the function symbols. This method was used in [9] . Secondly, one can use the fact that algorithm S t only constructs interpretations (E, M ) in which the interpetations of the predicates F are functional. This is because it introduces a witness only when it has to, and the only position where a predicate F can be false but not in conflict with an interpretation (E, M ), is in the seriality axioms. Thirdly, one can give a direct proof. Because the only positive occurrence of a predicate F is in the seriality axioms Πx Σy F t (x, y), the interpretations of F can be made functional, without making any of the other formulas false. We will use the last approach.
Theorem 6.7. Anti-Skolemization is a widening operation: Let A be a Kleene formula that is in NNF and radicalized. Let f 1 , . . . , f k be the function symbols Lemma 6.8 tells for example that I( Πx P (x, s(x)) ) = I( Πxz S f ,e (x, z) ⊕ P (x, z) ) if I interprets S as the relation that represents function s.
Lemma 6.9. Let A be a Kleene formula that is in NNF and radicalized. Assume that A has form ( Πx 1 · · · x n Σy F t (x 1 , . . . , x n , y) )⊗A ′ , and that all occurrences of predicate F in A ′ are of form F λ (t 1 , . . . , t n , u) where λ does not contain t. Let I be an arbitrary interpretation with domain D. Let I ′ be obtained from I by restricting F t in such a way that the following conditions are met:
• I ′ ∼ F I,
• For all d 1 , . . . , d n , e ∈ D, if I(F )(d 1 , . . . , d n , e) = t, then I ′ (F )(d 1 , . . . , d n , e) = I (F )(d 1 , . . . , d n , e).
• For all d 1 , . . . , d n ∈ D there still exists an e ∈ D, s.t. I(F )(d 1 , . . . , d n , e) = t.
Then I(A ′ ) = t implies that I(A) = t.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have developed a sound and complete theorem proving procedure for Partial Classical Logic (PCL). A context is first decomposed into a set of sequents that represents the type assumptions and theorems that occur in it. After that, the resulting sequents are transformed into Kleene logic. Due to redundancy that is introduced by the decomposition into sequents, it is possible to ignore the possibility that formulas are ill-typed (are interpreted as e) during further transformations on the sequents. This redundancy can be used to radicalize the Kleene formulas into formulas that always have a definite truth value. Once the formulas have been radicalized, various theorem proving strategies can be applied on them. In most cases, including all examples in this paper, the radicalizations of theorems can be treated as classical. We interpret this as: Once a theorem has been type checked, it can be treated as if it is classical. The redundancy, introduced by decomposition of a context into sequents, made it possible to simplify the sequent calculus Seq 2 P CL of [8] into a new calculus Seq P CL , which has fewer, and simpler reasoning rules. Because it is based on intermediate transformation to Kleene logic, it is closely related to the transformations that we have developed in this paper for theorem proving. Because of this, we included a description of Seq P CL in this paper.
In the near future, we will extend Geo ( [10] ), which currently uses untyped classical logic, to PCL. It follows from Theorem 2.14 that the same theorem proving procedure can be used for checking type conditions and for proving theorems. In practice, it will probably be necessary to use different settings. Type correctness proofs usually do not require equality reasoning, and reason on subformulas of a given goal only. We plan to study adaptions of the general procedure, that may be more effective.
We have chosen geometric logic as a starting point for theorem proving in PCL, because we expect that it is well-suited to problems where type conditions mix with other predicates, and that it will have good termination behaviour in case when a goal is not provable. These were the original reasons why geometric logic with flattening was introduced in [9] . In CASC 2007 ( [20] , [19] ), Geo came second in the model finding category. Nevertheless, it is likely that superposition-based strategies can be used as well. In order to test this, the superposition calculus of [1] has to be adopted to Kleene logic.
